The centerpiece of next year's political debate, beginning with the legislative session in January, needs to be Alaska's economic future. To those who have studied Alaska's economic fundamentals, that future is bleak. If the next Governor and legislators do not alter Alaska's present course, the second fifty years of statehood will be much, much more difficult than the first.
The future currently is bleak because of the trajectory of Alaska's oil industry. Oil accounts for 90 percent of state general fund revenues and one-third of Alaska jobs. No other industry comes close to having the capability to generate the same level of wealth for Alaskans. As James Carville - who repeatedly reminded the Clinton team during the 1992 election that "it's the economy, stupid" - would say if he looked at Alaska today, "it's the oil, stupid."
The future of Alaska's oil industry is in significant doubt. From a high of over 2 million barrels per day, North Slope oil production - the lifeblood of the Alaska economy - is down to 700,000 barrels per day. Absent continued investment, the existing sources of production (and oil's contribution to state government revenue and jobs) will decline at a rate approaching 10 percent per year in the coming years. Because the trans-Alaska oil pipeline is not designed to handle low flow, knowledgeable people talk about the need to shut down the trans-Alaska oil pipeline when production reaches roughly 300,000 barrels per day.
On that trajectory, the Alaska oil industry may reach shutdown as early as 2017. Even if the date for shutdown is extended, by that time the continued decline in revenues nevertheless will result in significant reductions in government services, the beginning of state income and sales taxes, the outmigration of a significant number of people, and the resulting collapse in home and local business values.
The shutdown - and even the decline - is not inevitable. According to testimony submitted before the Alaska Legislature in 2006, there is roughly as much known oil and gas resource remaining on the North Slope as has been produced since the start of Prudhoe.
Decline and shutdown is a likely scenario, however, unless our state government's current oil and gas policy changes. The 2006 legislative testimony additionally demonstrates that developing the remaining known resource will require significant amounts of investment.
Because of the policy decisions made by the state's political bodies since 2006 (with the continued encouragement of the state's largest newspaper), a significant portion of the investment that would otherwise have been made in Alaska over the last few years has gone - and is continuing - to go elsewhere. The result is that Alaska is living on the fumes remaining from prior investments; without making the new investments required to develop additional resources, Alaska's economic gas tank inexorably is moving toward empty.
How have we come to this place? In her book, Sarah Palin recounts that she came into office to "kick industry's ass." The pendulum swung much farther. She, Hollis French and the legislature that followed them, succeeded in kicking oil investment out of Alaska.
Because they have it in their power to do so, how do Alaskans change that future? There are three steps.
First, reform Alaska's oil and gas production taxes to focus on long-term investment. Some who passed ACES argue that it already does that; it does not. Unlike tax regimes that attract investment, ACES taxes away the upside to industry when prices are high, forcing oil and gas companies essentially to accept utility-like returns. The proof is in the pudding; while the New York Times reports "excitement" elsewhere in the world industry, investment in the development of additional Alaska resources has cratered since ACES was passed. In mid-November, ConocoPhillips, "Alaska's Oil and Gas Company," announced for the first time in the last 45 years that it would not drill an exploration well on Alaska state lands this coming year.
Second, terminate AGIA. Whether AGIA was right or wrong when passed in 2007, the world has changed. As the federal Energy Information Agency, the highly respected Potential Gas Committee, and widely respected industry observer Daniel Yergin all have concluded, Lower 48 shale gas is a game changer. As a result, the $500 million in state funds committed by AGIA to a Lower 48 project increasingly looks like a fourth down, one-second-on-the-clock, Hail Mary pass from Alaska's own end zone. Alaskans need to redirect state funds to better targets.
Third, progress all options. A recent Anchorage Daily News editorial suggests at least some in the Parnell Administration favor eliminating efforts on a Bullet Line. Not only is the Bullet Line potentially important to overcoming the decline in Cook Inlet production, it may provide the best way to monetize North Slope gas in the face of the paradigm shift in the Lower 48 gas market. This is not the time to defer potential options; it is the time to maintain full speed on all of them.
Given the lead times required to develop new sources, the critical decisions that will determine the long-term future of the Alaska economy will be made during the term of the Governor we elect in 2010. Perhaps because they were involved in bringing Alaska to this point, many of those who seek to lead Alaska in the upcoming, critical term strive to point the debate in another direction.
Governor Parnell, for example, spends his political capital talking about the need to encourage development on the federal Outer Continental Shelf, over which an Alaska Governor has no control and which will not produce either state royalties or production tax revenues.
Apparently seeking to continue Governor Palin's "kick ass" approach, Senator French touts his extensive involvement in creating ACES, ignoring the fact that it is rapidly depleting Alaska's future.
Alaskans need to demand more from those who would lead them. The candidates need to spell out how Alaska will overcome the current economic trajectory. They need to recognize "it's the oil, stupid." If not, the relevant question quickly will become "who lost Alaska's future."
Brad Keithley co-heads Perkins Coie, LLP's global oil and gas practice from the law firm's Anchorage office.
As fair disclosure I should mention I practice law with gubernatorial candidate Bill Walker. Nonetheless, although we have a shared vision on many oil and gas issues and I strongly support his candidacy, these comments are strictly my own.
I thought you submitted a good, thought provoking article. I agree that this is a critical time for our State to either reinvigorate the North Slope or face a structural retraction of our economy.
However your predictions about TAPS are too aggressive. First, the producers are now sponsoring 200,000 bbl/d as the mechanical throughput floor on TAPS (not 300,000 bbl/d) given the reconfigured pumps. But even that as a mechanical limit is questionable. It’s uncontested that TAPS won’t reach laminar flow until well under 100,000 bbl/d which makes operating down to that level pretty much an engineering problem (heaters, antifreeze, recirculation, etc.). Given my understanding that TAPS opex and capex is in the neighborhood of 15% of total ANS costs, it will likely be the underlying field economics on the largest fields that will determine when the North Slope gets shut-in rather than physical or economic constraints associated with the pipeline. Alyeska is funding a pretty major low flow effort so we’ll hopefully get specifics in the next year or so.
Second, production decline has been in the neighborhood of 6%, and maybe 10% without ongoing capex is what we’d be seeing, but that rate of decline will not be continuous. The evidence is overwhelming that almost all the North Slope fields - including Prudhoe, Alpine and Kuparuk - will decline hyperbolically and not exponentially meaning long production tails. Think McArthur River.
If you combine even the pessimistic 200,000 bbl/d throughput floor with hyperbolic decline curves Alaska can safely expect production from the North Slope for decades to come. That said considering the decline trends it will be at significantly reduced volumes which is a double whammy for state revenues. Not only will the number of barrels be reduced, but the substantial ANS fixed costs will be allocated over fewer and fewer barrels. Since royalty, severance, and income taxes are all basically profit based this results in not only less barrels but less money per barrel. High, long-term oil prices might save the state fisc, but of course that will be economic doom for all our residents and communities not connected to cheap natural gas.
Thus I think your three suggestions all deserve serious debate. When you get into the detail your second and third suggestion (terminate AGIA and pursue all options) are no brainers, but I think the jury is still out on whether ACES needs reforming. The structure of ACES – particularly that it’s a profit based tax with shifting marginal rates based on oil prices – is good progressive tax policy. The State wants to be partners with industry and reduce its take during the tough times and increase them during the good times. However, just because the machine is sound doesn’t mean it’s properly tuned. We need to make sure the marginal rate is low enough, and investment credits large enough, to create an attractive investment climate. But unlike you I’m not convinced we have a problem. We don’t have a good dataset yet on the pre and post-ACES investment delta, and what we do have is colored by a sharp decline in oil prices, a bad economy and likely punitive behavior from the producers. I think it will take another year or two at least for us to know whether we need to revisit ACES.
Craig Richards
There is a lot we can do about Alaska's economic future.
First we have to abandon the anti-oil company policies of the Palin/Parnel administrations. These policies have been abject failures and we need to recognize that the oil companies are not the enemy.
Second we need positive leadership that can provide direction to various state agencies to work together towards a common goal. The latest revelations about Noah and his problems with DNR concerning gas to southcentral is a case in point.
In 2010 we will have chance to change direction, we will see what happens.
Regarding Alaska's economic future:
I've seen Alaska make the same visionary error again and again by advocating projects that either aren't scaled correctly for our small and widely scattered population, or that don't take into account phenomenal geographic, economic, and distance barriers-- Moving the State capitol to Willow, finding someone to build a natural gas line to the Midwest, the Susitna project, a railroad to Nome, etc. Back in the 1960s a group even wanted to divert the Yukon River to the Lower 48.
Time and again these projects don't go anywhere (it seems to me) for one simple reason, money. Way, way too much money. Thank heavens they didn't divert the Yukon! I think a bullet line may turn out to be too expensive too.
I lived in Fairbanks for 25 years, and I don't understand why the heck they never figured out a way to bring natural gas there. For example, why didn't they use the Alaska Railroad to ship LNG from Cook Inlet? This would have required infrastructure, but I think it could have been cost effective.
Perhaps the reason this, and other smaller scaled projects haven't occurred could be because of Alaska's systemic wildly ambitious grand economic visions. For decades people have been saying "when the gas line gets built." We should pass a law requiring people to always include the phrase "Will I be alive" before saying "when the gas line gets built."
Regarding leadership, I hope we have a change of leadership in Alaska. I think we need to put our previous leadership errors behind us. I've been to meetings where DNR showed up and I've usually been baffled with them. I must admit I advocated AGIA myself, but what a difference 2 years makes.
Regarding anti-oil company policies, as an Alaskan I don't know if we are anti-oil company or not. Alaskans can't find out how much money the oil companies are making here. Exxon wouldn't answer the question at a legislative hearing. I don't know what is fair, but if they're not going to tell us how much they're making, I wouldn't know how to evaluate what is or isn't fair.
I did read in Wall Street Journal a couple years ago that most oil company profits were being used for dividends and stock buy-backs. A relatively small amount was used for capital investment in places like the North Slope-- apparently if we gave them a tax break, perhaps less than half of these savings would get spent on capital projects, and even less on Alaska capital projects.
If we make tax concessions, I'd advocate they give us something tangible in return. I don't want Alaska's concessions to just fatten dividends or stimulate development in other places.
I enjoy Alaska Dispatch and the readers' comments.
As I discussed in a previous Tundra piece ("Repeating history on the gasline", Oct. 19, 2009, http://bit.ly/7W4GSC), "waiting" (as you suggest for ACES) is not an option that has served Alaska well over the years. Many more times than not, "waiting" has permitted other developments to occur (e.g., shale gas) which have put Alaska farther back than it was before the wait began.
The same also is true of deferring action on ACES. “Waiting” to stem the lost investment that is resulting under ACES will do significant damage to the Alaska economy even if a complete shutdown is deferred. At a minimum, "waiting" will defer new investment. Because of the lead times involved in new projects, the resulting delay will push the production response until well past the time that the Alaska economy begins to suffer deeply. More importantly, Alaska may lose the delayed investment entirely, even if you assume that TAPS can be modified to accommodate low flow, if during the “waiting” period producers become committed to other regions or, has occurred with shale gas, a technological leap forward occurs in the meantime in other areas that make Alaska oil less attractive.
Your argument that waiting is justified because other things may be masking the adverse effect of ACES does not stand up. As the New York Times reported in September, "[t]he oil industry has been on a hot streak this year, thanks to a series of major discoveries that have rekindled a sense of excitement across the petroleum sector, despite falling prices and a tough economy." http://bit.ly/7wDTYY. Alaska is mentioned only as a historical footnote.
The facts are significant industry investments have continued elsewhere, outside of Alaska, despite the factors that you argue have a masking effect. With a pro-investment tax policy, Alaska could be as much a “hot spot” as anywhere else in the world. With ACES, Alaska will continue in its role a historical footnote. (Your suggestion that Alaska’s results are “likely” colored also by “punitive producer behavior” is misguided. In my 30+ years observing the industry from a number of perspectives, I have never witnessed a situation where producers have avoided otherwise economically sound investments to “send a message.” Although lawyers may, the engineers who largely run the companies simply don’t think that way.)
Waiting for an additional “year or two” also is not justified by a need to “complete the data set.” We now have two years of experience that demonstrates ACES, as it is currently constructed, is consistently pushing Alaska’s projects below the investment cutoff point. The data is stark. In 2006, before the 2008 price run up, Petroleum Argus, a major industry trade publication ran a story entitled “Investment poised to pour into the upstream (Alaska Special Report),” http://bit.ly/2COXh. Not only did that investment not materialize even with higher prices, last month ConocoPhillips (“Alaska’s Oil & Gas Company”) announced, for the first time in 45 years, that it does not intend to drill an onshore exploration well in Alaska in the coming year .
For the reasons I explain in the previous Tundra piece, in my experience Alaska has twice missed the window of opportunity for a gas line because politics stalled the project until the window closed. “Waiting” to address the significant problems created by ACES puts Alaska on the same path on the oil side. Given the importance of oil to the Alaska economy, Alaska cannot afford that path.
Brad
2002?
2003?
2004?
2005?
2006?
2007?
2008?
How would this compare to what Alaska got? Anyone? Anybody know?
The ratio of state to oil company revenue is largely irrelevant. You have to put yourself in the producer's shoes and it is obvious they will make investment where the returns are greatest considering the risk. It is also obvious from the lack of drilling plans in 2010 that the decision has been made that investment in Alaska has less potential than elsewhere.
During a legislative hearing Rep. Ralph Samuels asked one of the oil companies how decisions were made concerning investment and they replied that corporate headquarters decided how much investment money was available and then each region, Alaska being one, submitted a plan of investment and corporate headquarters then made the decision on which region got the money. I agree with bgkeithley that oil companies do not make decisions to "send a message." The one exception to that is Exxon's decision to drill at Point Thomson. In the absence of a gas line, it is not economic to produce just gas liquids, but Exxon is doing it anyway to hold onto the leases.
One way to provide incentives for exploration is to cut ACES and tie the cut directly to investment.
At least you're in good company:
http://alaskadispatch.com/dispatches/politics/13-into-the-wild-ted-stevenss-indictment-mars-an-extraordinary-alaskan-legacy
"In 2006, while the Alaska Legislature was debating raising taxes on the oil industry, the FBI secretly documented Allen and another VECO executive as they bribed key lawmakers in a scheme to influence the vote and keep the tax hike to a minimum. In pleading guilty to bribery charges last year, Allen said that he was trying to look out for his clients-ExxonMobil, BP and ConocoPhillips-which VECO depended on for contracts."


Have you ever wondered what the mushers eat while out on the trail?




I appreciate your thoughtful words and I agree Alaska's economic future is at stake.
However I don't think there is much we can do about that. If I recall correctly, USGS said there are 13 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves remaining in the Cook Inlet region. That would be enough to supply all the United States for several months; those reserves could probably keep Cook Inlet users exclusively supplied for a couple hundred years. But we're "running out" of natural gas in Cook Inlet. Perhaps similarly, we're "running out" of North Slope crude.
Jay Hammond tried to set up a Permanent Fund to help sustain Alaska after North Slope natural resources got consumed. Unfortunately, as it now stands, the Permanent Fund probably wouldn't sustain our State government for more than 5 years.
I don't believe there is anything we can do to substantially stimulate North Slope production. The bottom line is the dinosaurs have been consumed. Or at least we've consumed the cheap ones.
A bullet line would be extremely expensive-- it might cost around 4 billion dollars-- a capital investment of perhaps 40 or 50 thousand dollars for every Railbelt and Cook Inlet household served. The State would also need to equitably invest a few billion more for areas not served by a bullet line.
I think there may be cheaper options for Cook Inlet natural gas users (like ocean shipped LNG imports). I worry about the Interior, but I hope prospects near Nenana will help there.
Despite the United States' trade deficit, there is (I think) a destructive sentiment in the United States-- that we shouldn't export Alaska's North Slope natural gas resources. Perhaps the only economically viable option for North Slope production would be to export to the Pacific Rim and China, but despite all our reliance on China (we have a huge deficit with China; we are addicted to their exports, and they help finance our budget deficits), we don't seem to want to export natural gas. That doesn't make sense to me (exports would help balance our trade deficit) but that's the way it is.
I believe Alaska is headed towards an inevitable economic train wreck that probably can't be avoided. I don't see a bullet line. I don't see a natural gas line.
I do see TAPS shutting down. Also, I think Conoco may not be investing in Alaska at this time because they may be planning to drive the Alaska Highway south. We could even zero out our State's oil production taxes, but I doubt it would have an effect. From what I've read, they may have their sights set elsewhere-- ironically in places like Iraq.
Sorry if I sound like a cynic. Hope my predictions turn out to be wrong.